Introduction
The existing accounts of the history of experimental economics focus on the experiments performed in game theory, on the tests about individual behavior under uncertainty, or on the laboratory replications of different market structures. There is another important stream of experimental research that studies the individual choices from certain alternatives. In this area, several experiments have been conducted to derive empirically the indifference curves of a subject, to test the assumption that the individual preferences are transitive, or to check whether the axioms of revealed preference are satisfied by actual behavior. These are all matters that in neoclassical economics traditionally pertain to the analysis of consumer demand, so that the experiments concerning the individual choice from certain alternatives are usually referred to as experiments in consumer demand theory.
The experimental research in this field is actually the oldest one in economics, since the first experiment was indeed performed in 1930 to derive the indifference curves of an individual. However, the historical accounts of this branch of experimental economics are short on details or incomplete 1 . The main goal of the present work is therefore to provide a first comprehensive reconstruction of the experimental research made in consumption theory in the early period 1930-70.
The initial year of this time interval is that of the first experiment mentioned above. As regards the closing date, before 1970 just six experiments in consumer choice were performed, three for deriving the indifference curves and three on the transitivity of preferences. These experimental studies were interwoven, both with respect to their topics as well as regards the individuals involved in them. experiments on different issues were conducted and new actors entered the scene, so that that date represents a plausible limit for the present narrative.
A further feature of the present reconstruction is that it explores the experimental research on choice behavior in connection with the 1930-70 developments in consumer demand theory. All the experiments under consideration were in fact motivated by theoretical questions and can be assessed in a proper historical way only against the background of the contemporary theoretical debate. Moreover, many of the main demand theorists of the period -H. Schultz, R. Frisch, H. Hotelling, N. GeorgescuRoegen, M. Friedman, J. Marschak, H.S. Houthakker, and L. Hurwicz, among others -were well aware of the ongoing experimental research in the field, and some of them also contributed to it in more or less direct ways.
In the opposite direction, the paper also investigates the impact of the experimental research on the developments of consumer demand theory. This inquiry is carried out by checking the references to each experimental study for the twenty years following its publication, basically in the journals of economics, business and finance listed in JSTOR, but also in other journals and relevant books. It turned out that in the period under consideration the influence of the experimental research on the theory of consumer behavior was indeed very limited. Yet, the present study shows that, at least in the United States, this was not due to lack of knowledge of the experimental work on the part of the economics profession.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 2-5 are devoted to the first experiment on indifference curves, to its backgrounds, and to its reception among the economists of the period. Sections 6-7 concern the second experiment on indifference curves, performed at the beginning of the 1950s when the experimental research in economics began to rise. Sections 8-10 discuss the three experiments testing the transitivity hypothesis on preferences, and their influence on the debate regarding the status of this hypothesis. Sections 11-12 outline the 1950s-1960s developments in consumer theory and experimental research, and discuss the last experiment on the indifference curves, whose results were published in 1969. Section 13 concludes.
Measuring utility: 1871-1930
Consumer demand theory originated in the marginalist value theories of C. Menger, W.S. Jevons and L. Walras, and became an autonomous body of doctrine with A.
Marshall's Principles. According to the marginalists, the economic value of a commodity depends on the evaluation the subjects give to its marginal units. This evaluation was called "final degree of utility" by Jevons (1871) , who first wrote down total utility as a cardinal function ( ) To the question, What is a unit of utility? F.Y. Edgeworth answered that it is "the just perceivable increment of pleasure, the minimum sensible" (Edgeworth 1881: 99) .
In his Mathematical Investigations, I. Fisher criticized this psychological conception of utility and proposed to shift the analysis away from the individual's sensations or motivations, towards the decisions humans actually make. If the individual chooses x 1 against x 2 , this means that the utility of x 1 is greater than the utility of x 2 . Whether the ground for such a choice "is 'pleasure' or [...] 'duty' or 'fear' concerns a phenomenon in the second remove from the economic act of choice and is completely within the realm of psychology" (Fisher [1892 (Fisher [ ] 1925 . However, Fisher's method for measuring utility based on the economic choices works just under the restrictive assumption that the utilities of the commodities are independent. Therefore, it did not solve the general problem of having an objective utility measure 2 .
Fisher's proposals were taken up by V. Pareto, who after 1900 considered it possible to construct economic theory just by examining the consumer's acts of choice.
The analytical tool Pareto brought into play in order to obtain this result was Edgeworth's indifference curve. For Edgeworth the bundles on the same indifference line were those that give the same utility to the subject, whereas for Pareto they were simply those the subject is unable to choose from, and in this sense, is "indifferent".
Pareto, in fact, imagined putting a subject -a sort of Buridan's ass -between two bundles x 1 and x 2 , then changing the composition of x 2 up to the point where the subject is no longer able to choose between x 1 and x 2 , thus determining that x 2 belongs to the same indifference line as x 1 (cf. Pareto 1900: 217, and Pareto 1906: 164-65 (Thurstone 1931) .
Thurstone's experiment
Thurstone's main concern throughout his career was the measurement of mental attitudes and abilities. He was an advocate of "psychology as a quantitative rational science" based on description and experimentation (Thurstone 1959: 3 ff.) , and he con- "The formulation of this problem is due to numerous conversations about psychophysics with my friend Professor Henry Schultz [...] . It was at his suggestion that experimental methods were applied to this problem in economic theory (Thurstone 1931: 139) .
Apart from Schultz, in his article Thurstone cited no economist. The only explicit hint to the economic literature was the listing of Fisher's Mathematical Investigations in the references of the paper. In fact, Thurstone's purposes were only in part similar to the anti-psychological ones of Fisher's or Pareto's. On the one hand, as a scientist with an empiricist concern, Thurstone sought to provide an experimental basis to the concept of the indifference curve. On the other hand, as a psychologist he was not interested in abandoning the mental variable "utility". Rather, he endeavored to show that the experimentally derived indifference curves could be rationalized as the upshot of Fechner's psychological law, whose economic version affirms that the marginal utility of a commodity is inversely proportional to the quantity possessed of it.
Thurstone did not even use the economic terms utility and marginal utility but the psychologically-tinged expressions "satisfaction" and "motivation", mentioning just in a footnote their economic equivalents. All these elements make clear that Thurstone's experiment was primarily a psychometric rather than an economic one.
Let us examine it more in detail.
Thurstone considered three different commodities (hats, pair of shoes and overcoats) and assumed that the satisfaction associated with each commodity was positive (in economic terms, ( ) 0
for each good i). He also postulated that the motivation to acquire each commodity was positive but decreasing ( ( ) 0
Moreover, he posited that the motivation conformed to Fechner's law. This stipulates that the satisfaction associated with a good is proportional to the logarithm of its quantity ( ( ) ( )
, where i k is a constant characterizing each commodity i).
This last psychological postulate implies that the indifference curves are hyperbolas asymptotic to the axes, with equation
, where u is a fixed level of satisfaction or utility. The form of the indifference curves is, however, one of the things the experiment is expected to determine rather than an assumption prior to it.
Yet, Thurstone made clear that the last assumption is in fact an ex post rationalization of the experimental data.
In the experiment, a female subject was presented with a bundle containing a certain number of commodities, e.g. 8 hats and 8 pairs of shoes 3 . Each bundle was plotted on a Cartesian plane with the commodity quantities on the axes. Subsequently, in random order the subject was presented with other combinations (more than 200) of the same commodities, and asked to choose the preferred one. In this way, Thurstone built up two fields in the plane: one containing the bundles preferred to the initial one (these bundles were labeled with the sign plus), and the other field containing the bundles to which the initial bundle was preferred (these were labeled with the sign minus). Finally, Thurstone drew the indifference curve so that, as far as possible, all the preferred bundles lie above the curve and all the less preferred bundles lie below it. The as-far-as-possible clause means that in fact Thurstone discounted some anomalous preferences in order to draw a regular curve through the plus and the minus fields. According to him, the regular curve best fitting the recorded preferences was the hyperbolic curve
Following the described procedure, Thurstone constructed four indifference hyperbolic curves for hats and pair of shoes. Similarly, he constructed four curves for hats and overcoats. By using the method of averages, he estimated from the data the values of the parameters i k for hats, shoes and overcoats. Lastly, Thurstone checked the values of the parameters derived from the first two sets of comparisons (hatsshoes and hats-overcoats) by means of the third set of comparisons (shoes-overcoats).
He constructed four indifference curves for overcoats and shoes, and found that the agreement between the parameters predicted from the first two sets of comparisons and the parameters empirically derived from the third set of comparisons were quite satisfactory. Thurstone's general conclusion is that his paper showed that:
"It is possible to reduce the indifference function to experimental treatment and that it is possible to write a rational equations for the indifference function which is based on plausible psychological postulates" (Thurstone 1931: 165 
Consumer theory and the reception of Thurstone's paper in the 1930s
In order to appraise the reception of Thurstone's experiment it is convenient to outline the main developments of consumer theory during the 1930s. In that period, the starting point of the research was Pareto's Manual of Political Economy (1906) . In this work two approaches to demand analysis could be found: the behaviorist approach, according to which consumer theory should be based only on the observable choice behavior; and the ordinalist approach, backing the idea that consumption theory can be based on utility as a ranking index. However, as observed by many authors from the 1930s on, Pareto's theory was defective on both lines of attack 4 .
In their celebrated 1934 paper, J.R. Hicks and R.G.D. Allen built up Pareto's analysis adopting a behaviorist approach. They replaced utility with the marginal rate of substitution and decomposed the effect of a price change on demand into income and substitution effects (Hicks-Allen 1934) . Between 1935 and 1936 was rediscovered the paper in which E. Slutsky (1915) Samuelson (1938) showed that almost all the empirical restrictions on demand that derive from the constrained maximization of an ordinal utility function can also be obtained starting from a simple coherence assumption about consumer behavior.
This assumption is what was later termed the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference.
Going back to Thurstone, despite the fact that his paper was published in a psychological journal, it was sufficiently known among the main American demand theorists and the European demand theorists visiting the United States in that period. However, the references to it were quite cursory and mainly critical.
In June 1932, Thurstone presented his experimental study at the meeting of the Econometric Society held in Syracuse, New York, and attended also by Frisch and H.
Hotelling. The Norwegian Frisch, who was in the United States conducting research, had explored the possibility of measuring the marginal utility of money using statistical demand data in two innovative works (Frisch 1926 and 3). Basically, Georgescu-Roegen also criticized the hypothetical nature of the subject's decisions in Thurstone's study. Hotelling cited only once Thurstone's experiment, writing only that the psychologist "succeeded in mapping out in a tentative manner the indifference loci" (Hotelling 1938: 248) . Schultz himself recalled
Thurstone's experiment only in two occasional footnotes (Schultz 1931: 78, n. 5, and Schultz 1938: 15, n. 18) . As regards Samuelson, Allen and Hicks, I found no reference to Thurstone's experiment in their writings.
In conclusion, it can be said that Thurstone's paper had a negligible impact on the 1930s developments of demand theory both in the United States as well as in Europe.
At least in the United States, this does not seem to be due to lack of knowledge of his paper. More crucial appears the fact that Thurstone's experiment was somehow at odds both with the ordinalist tenets as well as with the behaviorist ideas of the period.
From an ordinalist viewpoint, the experiment was undermined by Thurstone's cardinal conception of utility. For the behaviorist, the experiment simply did not bear on the actual choices of individuals. (Schultz 1935 and 7 . In these two works, Schultz had applied the PSAH theory to the analysis of statistical data regarding the demand for beef, pork and mutton. One empirical implication of the theory is that for an individual the compensated variation of the demand for a good when the price of another commodity varies (that is, the cross-price substitution effect) is symmetrical. Schultz found instead that the cross-price substitution effects were asymmetrical in magnitude and, for pork and mutton, even different in sign. Schultz was aware that the symmetry of the individual cross-price substitution effect generally does not carry over the aggregate demand and hence that his findings represented no falsification of the PSAH theory (Schultz 1935: 474-75, and Schultz 1938: 630-31) . However, such findings certainly did not corroborate the PSAH framework and cast some doubts about its usefulness for the analysis of statistical data 8 .
The Wallis-Friedman critique of Thurstone's experiment
In a Wallis and Friedman argued that in the course of such a prolonged process of data recording, the individual preferences would change so that the entire estimating procedure would fail 9 . The conclusion of their discussion regarding the experimental derivation of the indifference curves is skeptical:
"These are more than technical or practical obstacles and indicate that it is probably not possible to design a satisfactory experiment for deriving indifference curves from economic stimuli" (Wallis-Friedman 1942: 181).
As concerns the statistical approach, it is based on the result stating that the purchased quantities identify a point on the indifference curves where the slope of the curve is equal to the ratio of the market prices. This suggests the possibility of using the statistical data on consumer purchases for estimating the indifference surfaces. Wallis and
Friedman were skeptical also with respect to this approach. The indifference curves are in fact defined for a single person, at a given moment, and under a ceteris paribus clause, so that they can easily vary when prices, income, or time change.
Wallis' and Friedman's general conclusion was that the difficulties of deriving quantitative counterparts of indifference curves are basically due to the fact that the PSAH indifference analysis separates the "taste factors" (preferences) from the "opportunity factors" (prices, income) while they are inextricably interwoven. This ren-ders the indifference apparatus useless for practical purposes. Wallis and Friedman supported therefore the approach that isolates the factors correlative with consumer demand (income, wealth, prices, family type, occupation, age, nationality, etc.) and determines statistically their specific influence.
The Wallis-Friedman critique regarding the empirical relevance of the indifference curves did not prevent the PSAH approach from remaining the standard one in the neoclassical analysis of consumer demand. The paper of the two Chicago scholars was more influential as an early methodological discussion on the factors that can undermine the value of an economic experiment on individual choice. Their appraisal of Thurstone's experiment had pointed out the importance of using real stimuli that can actually induce the subject to reveal her preference, and the necessity of evaluating carefully all the factors that can modify the experimental situation (the elapse of time, modifications of the external environment, preference for variety and other effects induced by the experimental procedure itself). As we will see below, in this methodological guise the Wallis-Friedman paper became a reference point for some of the economists performing experiments on individual choice during the 1950s and 1960s.
Moreover and despite the skepticism about the experimental approach recorded in their 1942 paper, at the beginning of the 1950s Wallis or Friedman themselves would contribute as discussants to three important experiments on decision making.
Experimental research in the late 1940s and the early 1950s
Whereas until the end of the 1940s Thurstone's experiment remained an isolated exception in economics, in the late 1940s and the early 1950s an increasing amount of experimental research began to be conducted 10 . E.H. Chamberlin (1948) explored the performance of a market by reproducing it in the classroom. He induced demand and supply among his students at Harvard by assigning to each of them a reservation price as a buyer or a seller of a commodity, and found that the average price and the quantities exchanged were different from those predicted by perfect competition theory.
Though, Chamberlin's market experiment had no follow-up until the late 1950s. and studied experimentally the game that subsequently came to be known as the prisoner's dilemma (cf. Flood 1951 Flood -52, 1952a Flood , 1952b . According to Vernon Smith, the success of the conference in stimulating experimental research "must be judged much more modest than in furthering theory"; despite this, its influence "on subsequent experimentation, and upon fundamental concepts, [...] was very significant and lasting" (Smith 1992: 261) .
The Rousseas-Hart composite indifference map
Also at the beginning of the 1950s, the second experimental study in consumer theory PhD student at Columbia and was preparing a dissertation on the logical and empirical foundations of the subjective theory of value 13 . The 1951 paper was the only contribution of Rousseas and Hart to experimental research and afterwards they both moved to the study of macroeconomic themes.
The basic aim of Rousseas and Hart was to show that the PSAH theory of consumer demand was not a framework of purely analytical propositions but had instead an effective empirical basis. They noted that denials of the empirical content of the PSHA had come from quite different quarters, e.g. the Marxist economist Maurice Dobb, the eclectic John Maurice Clark (at that time at Columbia), and from Wallis and Friedman. Rousseas and Hart were mainly concerned with the Wallis-Friedman attack and aimed to rebut it by showing that the experimental procedure was indeed suited for identifying empirically the indifference curves. Rousseas and Hart (1951: 290) judged that the results of Thurstone's experiment were "quite poor". They deemed that this was mainly due to Thurstone's method of eliciting the indifference curves by asking a single subject to evaluate too large a number of commodity combinations: "This inquiry would be more likely to generate a nervous breakdown than a body of valid evidence" (Rousseas-Hart 1951: 290) .
Moreover, as Wallis and Friedman had pointed out, actual tests on a single individual would have taken so long a time that his preferences would have changed in the meanwhile. Rousseas and Hart claimed that both these problems could be circumvented by asking to a group of individuals with homogeneous tastes to make few, very simple choices within a short period of time. The crucial hypothesis of homoge-neity of tastes was posited by Rousseas and Hart as a preliminary assumption to be tested in the course of the experiment.
The experiment involved a class of graduate sociology students at Columbia University, probably in 1950 14 . It consisted of two runs at an interval of a month. In the first run 67 students participated, whereas in the second 54 students of the initial group participated, plus 10 new students. Each student received a card listing three different combinations of scrambled eggs and bacon strips, was asked to rank them, and had apparently to eat the top ranked combination.
Actually, Rousseas and Hart were very vague on this last point and wrote only that 318). Unlike Thurstone, Rousseas and Hart did not try to give mathematical expression to the indifference graph they had obtained experimentally.
The entire procedure was repeated in the second run of the experiment, which served to refine the observations made in the first one. According to Rousseas and Hart, the overall data confirmed the initial assumption of taste homogeneity. Moreover, since the experimental observations had been collected in a short time and the individual preferences appeared to have remained constant during this period, Rous-seas and Hart claimed that the Wallis-Friedman objections to Thurstone's study "do not apply to this [i.e., their] experiment" (Rousseas-Hart 1951: 318) . In conclusion, Rousseas and Hart contended to have shown that it is possible to get an empirical counterpart for the indifference curves and that, consequently, the propositions of the PSAH demand theory could not be charged with being merely analytical.
However, the Rousseas-Hart experiment has two main flaws that mar this conclusion. First, the hypothesis of taste homogeneity is actually highly questionable: some subjects were presented with the same bacon-eggs combinations and their rankings proved to be divergent. Second, the way the individual indifference maps were plotted and then put together in order to draw a well-behaved composite map appears quite arbitrary. Probably because of these drawbacks, the Rousseas-Hart experiment seems to have had no influence on subsequent economic research. During the twenty years following its publication, in all the journals of economics, business and finance listed in JSTOR the Rousseas-Hart paper was cited only twice: the first one in an occasional footnote by J. Rothenberg (1953: 258, n. 2) , and the second one by K.R.
MacCrimmon and M. Toda (1969: 435-36) in the third experimental study on the indifference curves.
May's experiment on the transitivity of preference patterns
Another byproduct of von Neumann and Morgenstern's book was the spread into economics of the treatment of preference as a formal relation, whose properties can be stated axiomatically. The axiomatic handling of preferences was adopted by Marshack (1950) , employed by Houthakker in his important article on revealed preference (1950), and perfected by K. Arrow in Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) . One of the key axioms on the preference relation is that it is transitive, which means that if x is preferred to y and y is preferred to z, then x must be preferred to z.
During the 1950s, the testing of the transitivity assumption became a new line of investigation for the experimental research. In the first part of the paper, May clarified the crucial role of the transitivity assumption in utility theory. The ordinalist-utilitarian representation of preferences initiated by Pareto states that higher utility numbers must be assigned to preferred alternatives. When transitivity does not hold, cyclical preference patterns can occur, in the sense that it can happen that x is preferred to y, y is preferred to z and z is preferred to
x. According to the utilitarian representation of preferences, this implies that
, which is, however, a contradiction. May argued that this result could be used to test the legitimacy of using a utility function in the analysis of individual decision making: "This result means that transitivity is necessary for utility. It makes it possible to test the hypothesis of the existence of a utility function by experimental tests of transitivity. Where transitivity does not hold, the use of utility is not justified" (May 1954: 3-4 ).
May in fact claimed that circular patterns in individual preference do occur. He first recalled the well known paradox of majority voting. In this case, the intransitivity at the level of collective choice arises from the aggregation of transitive individual pat-terns. May's idea was to apply the paradox of voting to individual choice, and to check experimentally if intransitive preference patterns may arise when the individuals order the alternatives according to conflicting criteria.
His experiment was simple and pretty informal. The subjects were 62 college students, presumably at Carleton College (May provided no information regarding the precise venue and date of the experiment). The alternatives proposed to the students were three hypothetical marriage partners, x, y, and z, which were characterized in terms of intelligence, beauty, and wealth. In intelligence, x was described as superior to y, and y as superior to z; y was portrayed as more beautiful that z, and z as more beautiful than x; finally, the subjects were told that z was richer than x, who was in turn richer than y. The individuals were confronted at different times only with pairs of hypothetical marriage partners, i.e. never with all three alternatives at once, and had to choose the preferred one. It is worth noting that the indifference option was ruled out.
The result of the experiment was that 17 of 62 students, i.e. more than 27 percent, exhibited intransitive preference patterns. In particular, they chose x over y, y over z and then z over x. May explained these cycles "as the result of choosing the alternative that is superior in two out of three criteria" (May 1954: 7) , that is, as the outcome of the majority rule applied to the conflicting features characterizing the marriage partners.
Concerning the relevance of these results to economics, May pointed out that the commodity bundles considered by economic theory are in fact vectors containing differed goods. If these goods are ranked according to conflicting criteria, circular preference patterns cannot be excluded. May's general conclusion was that his experiment suggested that individual preferences can easily be intransitive, so that: "The question is no longer 'Are preference transitive?' but rather 'Under what conditions does transitivity fails?' " (May 1954: 8) .
Papandreou's test on probabilistic transitivity
The other experimental study read at the Chicago meeting was that of Papandreou's.
Outside economics, Papandreou is most known as the founder of the Greek socialist party (Pasok) and the former prime minister of Greece (1981-89 and 1993-96 (Papandreou et al. 1955) 18 .
The most prominent individual in this group was Hurwicz, who had been research as- The expression "stochastic" in the title of the paper does not mean that Papandreou studied risky choices, i.e. choices among alternatives with uncertain outcomes like bets or lotteries. Rather, the expression "stochastic" refers to a probabilistic statement of the theory of choice among sure outcomes, originally proposed by GeorgescuRoegen (1936: 568 ff.) . Georgescu-Roegen's basic idea was to define preference in terms of frequency of choice rather than as an invariable relation, in the sense that an individual can be said to prefer x to y if, when confronted with this two alternatives more then once, chooses x over y more frequently than y over x. More formally, x is said to be "stochastically" preferred to y, if the probability that the individual chooses x over y is greater than 0.5. This probabilistic or stochastic theory of choice seemed suited to analyse the not so uncommon situations where the individuals make different choices when confronted with the same alternatives.
In the 1950s, a considerable stream of theoretical research was devoted to develop this probabilistic approach, to give it an axiomatic treatment, and to analyse the utilitarian representation of stochastic preferences 19 . The Papandreou experiment fits in this line of research and was set out to test the following stochastic version of the transitivity axiom: if the probability that an individual chooses x over y is greater than 0.5, and the probability that he chooses y over z is greater than 0.5, than the probability that he choose x over z is greater than the probability that he chooses y over z (all the inequalities are meant to be weak). In others terms, this axiom states that if x is stochastically preferred to y, and y is stochastically preferred to z, then it is more likely to choose x over z than to choose y over z 20 .
The Papandreou experiment was conducted with students from an elementary sociology class and a graduate class in education. In all probability they were students from Minnesota University (Papandreou is not explicit regarding the venue and the date of the experiment). The subjects were confronted with ten hypothetical activities of recreational nature, like "admission to a college basketball game between two nationally ranked teams", or "admission to an evening at the Minneapolis symphony under the direction of a leading conductor". These ten alternatives were combined into all possible 45 pairs. For each pair, Papandreou constructed the triple of bundles containing four admissions to the activities in the pair. For example, for the pair (basketball game, Minneapolis symphony), the three bundles with a total number of four admissions were: x=(3 basketball, 1 symphony), y=(2 basketball, 2 symphony), and z=(1 basketball, 3 symphony).
Between these three bundles, three binary comparisons are possible, namely x vs.
y, x vs. z, and y vs. z. Papandreou's axiom requires that the choices from these binary comparison be transitive in the probabilistic sense described above. 18 students participated in the six sittings of the experiment, which took place over a period of two and one-half weeks. In every sitting each student was asked to make 3 × 45=135 choices. The subjects were faced with such a large number of choices in order to reduce the influence of memory factors in inducing transitivity over the decisions.
Since the definition of the transitivity axiom is probabilistic, Papandreou's test was a statistical one. The binary choices were made over 45 triples and for 18 individuals, so that Papandreou's sample contained 45 × 18=810 observations. The null hypothesis to be tested was that the choices recorded in the experiment had been generated by stochastically transitive preferences. Unfortunately, the statistical properties of the test were not known, so that the appropriate critical region of rejection for the null hypothesis could not be defined with precision. Despite this, Papandreou claimed that this flaw was not really relevant because the experimental evidence supported the transitivity assumption beyond any possible doubt:
" Comparing the findings of May's and Papandreou's experiment, it comes out that they were not at all incompatible. Basically, the two scholars tested different axioms:
May tested the standard, deterministic transitivity axiom, whereas Papandreou examined a probabilistic version of transitivity. Yet, both experiments suggested that intransitive patterns (deterministic as well as probabilistic) can not be excluded from choice theory.
Before discussing the impact of these findings on the following developments of consumer theory, I briefly review the experiment the sociologist Arnold Rose performed on transitivity. Rose's study was in direct connection with May's and Papandreou's and its results were published in the Journal of Political Economy in 1957.
Rose's test and the impact of the transitivity experiments
Like Papandreou, Hurwicz and the other scholars who had performed the experiment on stochastic transitivity, also Rose taught at the University of Minnesota 22 . He had studied at Chicago University sociology (BA in 1938 and PhD in 1946) and economics (BA in 1939), and had been at Minneapolis since 1948. His research interests ranged from the study of racial integration, to the analysis of social perception of crime, to questions related to sociological method. His experiment was aimed to suggest that the intransitive behavior observed in common experience or recorded in experiments like those of May's and Papandreou's should mostly be considered as a case of "apparent intransitivity". By this term, Rose meant choice circularities that are not due to underling intransitive preferences, but to disturbing factors that enter in the passage from subjective preferences to observable choice behavior.
Rose presented 74 students of a sociology course at Minnesota University with 13 possible types of crimes. In a preliminary phase, the students had to rank the 13 crimes according to their seriousness. Subsequently, each student was presented in random order with every possible pair of crimes and had to indicate the more serious between the two, without the option of judging them indifferent. The experiment was replicated two months later with the same subjects. As in the studies of May and Papandreou, the choices the subjects made were in effect hypothetical.
Rose recorded 341 intransitive patterns of choice in the first run of the experiment and 336 in the second run. Only three students made no circularities whatsoever.
Rose then attempted to show that most of the recorded intransitivity was apparent. He first noted that more than 90 percent of the circularities made in the first run were different from those made in the second run, so that they could not be attributed to underling, consistently intransitive preferences. According to Rose, the cause of such circularities was in fact carelessness of judgment. As regard the remaining 10 percent of repeated circularities, they concerned crimes that the subjects had judged very close in the initial ranking. Rose claimed that in these cases the subjects were in effect indifferent about crimes and had selected one just because the instructions of the experiment told them to make a choice. Most likely, such choice was made in a random way and this was the source of the observed intransitivity. In conclusion, for
Rose the intransitivity recorded was always apparent intransitivity: "Transitivity [...] can be considered an axiom to be used as the basis of a theory, or it can be regarded as an observable property of choices [...] . From the latter point of view, there is no reason to suppose that all choices will be transitive" (Edwards 1953a: 477) .
The debate on whether the transitive assumption is a descriptive hypothesis, a normative postulate of rational behavior, or an assumption necessary for constructing a sys-tematic theory of choice and demand, began in the 1950s and lasts until today 23 . For the present study, it is important to point out that the experiments of May and Papandreou stimulated this debate, and that the discussion regarding transitivity always referred to at least one of them, especially in the 1950s but also later. In particular,
May's experiment was mainly referred to as a clear indication that preferences can be intransitive 24 . Other authors, instead, attributed May's evidence against transitivity to the fact that he had excluded the indifference option 25 . Quite singularly, in his influential survey on the state of consumption theory, Houthakker (1961: 730) judged the results of May's experiment "encouraging" for the transitivity assumption. As regards Papandreou's experiment, it is cited chiefly in the contributions on probabilistic choice theory to support the idea of a stochastic version of the transitivity axiom 26 .
Also Debreu (1958) and Arrow (1959) referred to May's and Papandreou's tests.
Rose's experiment was far less influential than the other two and is seldom cited in the literature 27 .
On the whole, however, the discussion on the transitivity axiom and the attempts to build a theory of choice based on some weaker version of it remained (and has remained until today) a secondary research subject in demand analysis. In the 1950s, the major contributions in the field were in fact devoted to clarify the relationship between the behaviorist and the ordinalist approach to consumer demand, and to complete the axiomatic foundation of the PSAH theory.
Consumer theory and experimental economics in the 1950s and 1960s
As regard Samuelson's revealed preference theory, the only restriction on demand functions that derives from the utility maximization hypothesis but not from the Weak Axiom is the symmetry of the cross-price substitution effects. This property is important since it is necessary for the existence of a utility function whose maximization generates the consumption choices expressed by a given demand function. The problem of defining under which conditions such a generating utility function exists, is the so-called "integrability problem" 28 . For our purposes, it suffices to say that in 1950 Houthakker introduced the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (an iteration of the Weak Axiom that rules out the possibility of cyclical choices) and showed that it is sufficient for the integrability of demand functions. On the basis of Houthakker's contribution, Samuelson (1950) proved that the PSAH framework and the Samuelson-Houthakker one led in effect to identical restrictions on demand. With respect to the ordinalist approach, Debreu (1959) carried out the axiomatic analysis of preferences and determined the assumptions which are sufficient to derive the continuous quasi-concave utility function required by the PSAH theory. In this way, Debreu provided the received ordinal demand theory with a sound axiomatic foundation and brought it to its current standard form.
In the field of experimental research, from the 1950s on the pace of new contributions quickened 29 . Edwards (1953b Edwards ( , 1954b Edwards ( , 1954c , D. Davidson and P. Suppes (1957) , Davidson and Marschak (1959) , and D. Ellsberg (1961) conducted experiments on individual behavior under uncertainty and tested the EU theory. T. Schelling (1957) , J. Stone (1958) and others after them studied gaming, bargaining and coordination problems. Chamberlin's idea of exploring the behavior of a market through a controlled experiment was put forward by A. Hoggatt (1959) , S. Siegel and L. Fouraker (1960) and V. Smith (1962) in the United States, and by H. Sauermann and R. Selten (1959) in Germany 30 .
In consumption theory, instead, no other experiment was performed until 1969.
P.H. Benson (1955) and E.A. Pessemier (1960) applied experimental techniques to marketing analysis of buying decisions, but their studies concerned peculiar issues as the optimal amounts of money a firm should spend upon packaging and advertising, or the elicitation of preferences among specific branded products. Therefore, these two studies are not relevant for our story, and in any event are not cited in the subse- Carnegie-Mellon University. As regards the Japanese Toda, after studies in psychics he had moved to psychology. In 1952 he had graduated from the Graduate School of Psychology at Tokyo University, then teaching at Hokkaido University. In 1962, he had published an often cited article in the psychological and cognitive literature that presented a behavioral model for a pseudo-human agent, the so-termed "Fungus-Eater
Robot". In his paper, Toda thanked Marschak for helpful suggestions (Toda 1962: 164) . In 1966-67 he was visiting professor at UCLA on Marschak's invitation 31 . It was during this period, more exactly in May 1967 , that the experiment under consideration took place.
MacCrimmon and Toda administered it to 7 UCLA undergraduates. In two experimental session held on two consecutive days, the students were asked to draw their indifference curves for money and pens, and then for money and French pastries. At the very end of the experiment, the students received a bundle of money and pastries and had to eat the pastries on the spot. Afterwards, they received a bundle containing money and pens. Therefore, for the first time in the experiments hitherto considered, the subject's choices were not merely conjectural but had actual consequences.
Like in Thurstone's experiment, each student was first presented with a reference bundle (labeled P 0 ) and asked to compare it with other bundles. Let call P A a combination the subject prefers to P 0 . If more is preferred to less for both goods, the subject should prefer to P 0 not only P A , but also all the bundles which yield no less amount of each good. In geometrical terms, not only P A but also all bundles above and to the right of P A belong to what Thurstone had called the "plus region" and MacCrimmon and Toda termed the "accept region". Symmetrically, if a bundle P R is rejected in favor of P 0 , also all the bundles below and to the left of P R are in the "reject region". By asking the subject to compare with P 0 new bundles not yet in the accept or reject regions, MacCrimmon and Toda were able to put tighter and tighter constraint on the locus where the indifference curve could lie, and this with a reduced number of comparison. When a satiation point existed for a commodity, as in the case of pastries, a less powerful but similar method was applied.
After this comparison phase, each subject had to draw her indifference curve passing through P 0 and lying in the area between the accept region and the reject region.
In order to motivate the individual to draw the indifference curve as carefully as she could to mirror her true preferences, MacCrimmon and Toda used a payoff procedure similar to that employed by G.G. Becker, M.H. DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) . The subject was told that after she had drawn the indifference curve through P 0 , a bundle in the commodity space would be selected at random. If the selected bundle would lie in the accept region delimitated by the plotted curve, the subject would receive it. If the selected bundle would be in the reject region, the subject would receive P 0 . It is easy too see this procedure induces a utility maximizer to draw her true indifference curve, and this independently from her attitude toward risk.
As mentioned above, the subjects actually received pens and money and had to eat the pastries, so that MacCrimmon and Toda claimed that the Wallis-Friedman objection against experiments with merely conjectural stimuli did not apply to their study.
Furthermore, MacCrimmon and Toda deferred the determination and distribution of payoffs after the second session of the experiment, so that the income as well as the preference-for-variety effects on which Wallis and Friedman had called attention, could be excluded. Finally, the Wallis-Friedman concern about the long time and the large number of observation necessary to elicit the indifference curves, had been handled by exploiting the non-satiation principle in the comparison phase.
Each student drew seven indifference curves for money and pens, and four indifference curves for money and pastries. The money-pens curves for each student did not intersect and were downward sloping. Although the curves were also generally convex, concave parts were recorded for two subjects. With respect to the moneypastries curves, they did not show a general negative slope, and the beginning of the positive slope clearly indicated a point of satiation for pastries. Even though no money-pastries curves crossed, the curves of three subjects joined up at their right end, so violating transitivity. The money-pastries curves were in general convex, but the curves of two subjects exhibited some concave parts.
In conclusion, MacCrimmon and Toda felt that they had "satisfactorily performed an experiment constructing indifference curves" (MacCrimmon-Toda 1969: 436) .
They basically attributed the concavities recorded to the subjects' "careless in considering the choices", and the joining-up of the curves to the subjects' "inability to represent graphically the minute differences in [their] preference" (MacCrimmon-Toda 1969: 446 and 447, respectively). Therefore, MacCrimmon-Toda suggested that the indifference curves satisfy the properties commonly postulated by consumer demand theory, at least for the small group of individuals and the particular commodities they had considered.
The first element that strikes the reader in the MacCrimmon-Toda paper is its careful methodological discussion of the factors that can mar the experiment's value. This is a major difference not only with respect to Thurstone's pioneering study, but also in comparison with the 1950s experiments previously considered. Such difference shows that between the 1950s and the end of the 1960s the methodological awareness in experimental designing had greatly developed, and mirrors the fact that experimental economics was emerging as a specific sub-discipline with its own scientific standards. As regards the MacCrimmon-Toda findings, they could also be interpreted as
showing that the violations of convexity and non-intersection are not so rare. Furthermore, the anomalies recorded by MacCrimmon and Toda probably would have been more numerous if they had not so carefully explained to the students the contradictory implications of curve intersections, and had not allowed them to adjust the plotted curves upon ex post reflection.
In any event, also the experiment performed by MacCrimmon and Toda had little impact on the subsequent theoretical work in demand analysis. In the period 1969-89, the MacCrimmon-Toda paper was cited only eleven times, mainly with reference to quite specific applicative problems, often in general surveys, and always in cursory way.
Conclusions
The present study reconstructed a basic part of the early history of experimental economics, namely that concerning the research on consumer demand behavior in the period 1930-70. The experiments performed in this early phase regarded the derivation of indifference curves and the evaluation of the transitivity hypothesis. Thereafter, experimental tests dealt with different issues, as the negativity of the substitution effect, the existence of Giffen goods or the validity of the revealed preference axioms.
The experimentation on animal choice behavior was also introduced, but no further experiment on indifference curves or transitivity took place. Therefore, it can be maintained that after 1970 a new phase of the history of the experimental research in consumer theory began. This phase could be the subject matters of a future study.
Regarding the period under consideration here, the influence of the experimental studies on the developments in consumer theory deserves a last consideration. As we have seen, such influence was very circumscribed. The fact that the methods for deriving experimentally the indifference curves appeared unconvincing, did not prevent the PSAH approach from remaining the standard one. The experimental evidence that preference can easily be intransitive may have provoked a discussion on the status of the transitivity hypothesis, but it certainly did not cause the abandonment of it. Finally, the insight that convexity and non-intersection of the indifference curves cannot be taken for granted has deserved not even a footnote in microeconomics textbooks.
From an epistemological viewpoint, the failure of the experimental research to influence the theoretical may be rationalized in different ways 32 . Without entering here into these methodological discussions, I claim that the present study has shown that, at least in America, the failure of the experimental research to affect consumer demand theory was not due to lack of knowledge on the part of the economics profession. Maybe unexpectedly, many prominent economists were somehow involved in this stream of research, and almost all the major theorists of the period -Arrow, Debreu, Friedman, Frisch, Georgescu-Roegen, Hotelling, Houthakker, Hurwicz, Marschak, Schultz -were aware of at least one of the early experiments in consumer theory or refer to them in their writings. The main absence in the present narrative is that of Samuelson, and this appears somewhat surprising given that the axioms of revealed preference, according to their operational character, seem to call quite naturally for an experimental test.
Footnotes

1
In his valuable review of the early history of experimental economics, A. Roth devoted to the subject only two and half pages (cf. Roth 1993: 186-88; reproduced in Roth 1995: 5-6) . Partial accounts of the early experiments in consumer theory can also be found in Edwards 1954a , Davis 1958 , and Sauermann-Selten 1967 In 1927 Fisher proposed a method for measuring the marginal utility of income, which however was still based on the assumption of independent utilities; cf. Fisher 1927: 175 ff. 3 In a personal communication to the experimental psychologist W. Edwards dated December 7, 1953, Thurstone specified the following: "I selected as subject a research assistant in my laboratory who knew nothing about psychophysics [...] . She had a very even disposition, and I instructed her to take an even motivational attitude on the successive occasions" (quoted in Edwards 1954a: 387). 4
See Hicks-Allen 1934 , Lange 1934 , Georgescu-Roegen 1936 , Samuelson 1938 and Hicks 1939 A widespread interpretation puts Hicks-Allen and Slutsky papers in the ordinalist camp. I make my case for their behaviorist and cardinal nature, respectively, in Moscati 2004. 6 In the same year, Thurstone's experiment was mentioned in two other papers (Tintner 1942 and Staehle 1942 ), but in a very generic way.
